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Removing rail subsidies could end up benefiting passengers
Taxpayer subsidies to the rail sector have increased dramatically in recent years,
with concomitant fare increases attracting widespread condemnation. Richard
Wellings argues that structural reform to the railways is necessary to reduce the burden on
the public purse. 
Taxpayer subsidies to the rail sector have reached astronomical levels. At £6 billion per
year (including Crossrail), they have roughly trebled in real terms over the last twenty
years. But the high rate of  subsidy has not led to a reduction in f ares, which have risen
above the of f icial rate of  inf lation in recent years. There are two main reasons f or the large increase in
taxpayer support. The f irst, and probably most important, is wastef ul investment in loss-making new
inf rastructure. This is the direct result of  policies that have aimed to increase public transport ridership
and reduce car use.
For much of  the post-war period, rail was viewed as a declining industry. Despite previous government
ef f orts to suppress private road transport, the step change in ef f iciency resulting f rom the door- to-door
transit of  passengers and f reight led to rapid growth in car and lorry traf f ic. A policy of  ‘managed decline’
was theref ore applied to the railways. Brit ish Rail received subsidies to keep the system going and there
was some modernisation of  key inter-city routes, but there was litt le enthusiasm to attempt to reverse
the long-term trend.
This changed with the ascendancy of  environmentalism within government. With their perspective
grounded in radical egalitarianism, environmentalists not only objected to the pollution produced by
private road transport; they also resented its social aspects – f or example, the way that cars had
become symbols of  wealth and individual expression. The environmentalist agenda gradually captured
university departments, various government bureaucracies, elements of  the media and eventually
national policy. In the mid- late 1990s, the road construction programme was cut back dramatically and a
new strategy introduced. Private road transport would be deliberately discouraged with travellers
encouraged to use buses, trams and trains instead.
For the railways this represented a sea change. The new policy meant that rail now had prospects f or
growth. It did not, however, change the f undamental economics. Since rail involves at least a three-stage
journey, compared to the door- to-door convenience of  private road transport, it remained unattractive
f or the vast majority of  journeys.
Following privatisation, however, the policy of  encouraging more rail travel appeared to be successf ul.
Usage rose by around 50 per cent between 1997 and 2012, to levels not seen in peacetime since the
1920s. This ref lected not just the impact of  various deliberate policies, but also other trends such as a
booming central London economy f or much of  the period and demographic changes that led to a huge
expansion of  the ‘inner city’, pushing middle-class f amilies out into the commuter belt to avoid poor
schools, anti-social behaviour and f ear of  crime.
A combination of  increased ridership and price controls produced severe peak-time overcrowding on
several routes into London. Train operating companies have been constrained in their ability to smooth
the peaks using the price mechanism, since season ticket f ares on most London commuter journeys are
regulated by the government. With a severely limited ability to deploy the price mechanism and other
means to make more ef f icient use of  existing rail capacity, the industry has increasingly f ocused on
supplying new inf rastructure to accommodate growth. This has proved hugely expensive, however. The
f inal cost of  the ongoing Thameslink 2000 upgrade, f or example, is likely to be £6 billion. And the
Crossrail scheme will cost £16 billion.
Since in commercial terms such projects are loss-making and would never be undertaken in their current
f orm by the private sector, taxpayers have been f orced to f und them. Accordingly, wastef ul investment in
new rail inf rastructure is probably the largest single f actor in the growth in taxpayer support in the post-
privatisation era. Such investment has not been restricted to overcrowded routes in the South-East. The
government also f unds improvements f or blatantly polit ical reasons, in regions where there is lit t le
passenger demand. For example, it was recently announced that branch lines in South Wales would be
electrif ied – at taxpayers’ expense, of  course. The environmentalist agenda means that rail schemes get
priority even though the government’s own cost-benef it analyses show that economic returns f rom road
improvements are f ar higher.
The second major reason f or the increased burden on taxpayers is the artif icial structure imposed by the
government on the post-privatisation rail industry. Historically, railways that developed in the private
sector exhibited a high degree of  vertical integration. This meant in practice that the same company
owned the tracks and operated the trains, thereby avoiding the transaction costs associated with
complex contractual arrangements between highly interdependent separate organisations.
Partly as a result of  EU policy, Britain’s privatisation model has been very dif f erent, with one f irm owning
and maintaining the tracks, other f irms operating the trains, and another set of  f irms leasing out the
rolling stock. On top of  all this complexity, the industry has been tightly regulated by various government
agencies. The resulting f ragmentation, combined with layers of  bureaucracy, needlessly increased costs
on the network. In addition, the high levels of  regulation severely hindered entrepreneurship. As a result,
the productivity-boosting innovations that have cut costs in other industries did not materialise on the
railways. Indeed regulation is now so restrictive that private rail f irms have ef f ectively become
subcontractors f or the Department f or Transport.
Structural ref orm would theref ore be one of  the best ways to reduce the burden on taxpayers. The
government should stop prescribing the level of  vertical integration and instead f ree the rail industry to
become more ef f icient. This policy should be combined with a more rational approach to rail investment. A
f irst step is to abolish price controls to remove artif icial distortions to f are levels and consumer
demand. The provision of  new capacity should then be lef t to the private sector, without taxpayer
support. It would make commercial sense to build new inf rastructure in high demand locations where it
could be f unded by f are revenues or land development. Uneconomic projects driven by polit ical motives
and special- interest lobbying would no longer get built.
The economic case f or phasing out subsidies is very strong. The taxes imposed on individuals and
businesses to support the railways destroy jobs and hinder wealth creation in the wider economy. In
addition, large parts of  the rail industry could thrive without the bureaucratic micro-management that
comes with government support. It may seem counter- intuit ive, but removing rail subsidies could also end
up benef it ing passengers, by unleashing entrepreneurship and innovation on the railways that would
drive down costs.
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